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When is a seaman, not a seaman (II)?

Frederick Phillips

Frederick Phillips

Published: November 07, 2024

 

The U.S 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Santee v Oceaneering International Inc of 12th March 2024 was discussed in – “When is a seaman, not a seaman (I)?”.  The decision was that Santee was not a member of the crew and the court held that he had fraudulently pleaded his status as a Jones Act Seaman working as a remote operated vehicle (ROV) technician aboard a drillship on the Outer Continental Shelf. 

The Court reached this decision by determining that Santee owed his allegiance to a shore-based employer, whilst viewing his role on-board the vessel as limited to a discrete task.

However, following Santee filing a petition for an en banc rehearing the 5th circuit has reversed its previous decision, indicating that Santee has potential arguments to qualify as a Jones Act seaman and has remanded the case back to state court for further proceedings.

The Two-Part Test from Chandris

The Fifth Circuit reconsidered this issue in conjunction with the two-part test set out in Chandris v Latsis 1995 (Chandris) which requires that:

  1.  The individual contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission; and
  2. The individual had a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that was substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.

The Four-Part Test from Sanchez

And, in conjunction with the four-part test set out in Sanchez v Smart Fabricators of Texas LLC [2019] which introduced the following additional considerations: 

  1. Is the individual subject to the “perils of the sea”? 
  2. Does the individual owe an allegiance to the vessel, or simply a shore-based employer? 
  3. Is the work sea-based or involving sea going activity? 
  4. Is the assignment to the vessel limited to a discrete task after completion the connection to the vessel ends.

The Relevant Tests are Satisfied.

The 5th Circuit held that Santee satisfied the first prong of the seafarer test, as set out in Chandris as his role and responsibilities in operating the ROV contributed to the DEEPWATER CONQUEROR’s mission involving underwater drilling efforts. Regarding the four-prong test (which supplements the second prong in Chandris), the 5th Circuit reanalysed Santee’s arguments and determined that:

  1. The ROV operation was sea-based (this was not in dispute).
  2. Santee was subject to the perils of the sea (this discussion had been omitted originally) as his role involving ROV work, and time at sea clearly subjected him to the perils and risks involved in sea going activity.
  3. Santee spent approximately 96% of his employment over the last five years onboard the DEEPWATER CONEQUEROR and was required to report to both the captain of the vessel, and the project leader (this contradicts the original decision that duration of service onboard a vessel is not substantial evidence of allegiance); and
  4. Santee’s assignment and responsibilities were not discrete, nor were they akin to the role of a longshoreman (who works onboard when a vessel calls to port), his employment did not have a pre-determined end date and he was assigned to the DEEPWATER CONQUEROR indefinitely. Finally, whilst he had opportunities to work extra jobs in between hitches without being formally assigned to a specific vessel, this point was considered to be moot when investigating a connection to the vessel and whether Santee was integral to the vessel’s mission This differs from the original decision where Santee was deemed a transient employee, whose work was limited to discrete tasks.

Conclusion

Noting the above the Court determined that Santee has a possible Jones Act claim and as required when analysing a fraudulent pleading analysis, the Court must resolve all disputed questions of fact in favour of the plaintiff and then determine whether there could be a valid claim against the defendant in question.

This recent decision highlights that duration onboard a vessel may meet the “allegiance” test if the seafarer also has substantial exposure to the perils of the sea. Furthermore, it is possible for a Jones Act seaman to have an allegiance to both the vessel, and a shore-based employer. In McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, the Supreme Court ruled that the Jones Act “established a clear distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers” and that those “who owe their allegiance to a vessel and not solely to a land-based employer, are seamen.” As Santee spent 96% of his employment time in the last five years, assigned to the DEEPWATER CONQUEROR, the 5th Circuit held that the allegiance factor weighed in his favour.

Regardless of whether alternative work in between hitches is completed, and no formal assignment to a specific ship is present, the individual may have an appropriate connection to a vessel in the eyes of the Court. 
 

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