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Nigeria Security and Port Update, August 2017

SSM Roundel

Steamship Mutual

Published: September 07, 2017

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The Club has received information from P&I service providers concerning security and Port issues relating to Nigerian Ports, the text of which is set out below.
In respect of the section entitled ‘Officialdom’, the Managers would add that when given in these circumstances, gifts of any kind are regarded as bribes or facilitation payments in most jurisdictions, and the Club cannot fund or reimburse such payments. The Club’s approach to these issues, and the unavailability of cover in respect of such payments or gifts is addressed in the Club’s Bribery Act Statement.

Nigeria security and port update August 2017

Nigeria
The new President was inaugurated in Nigeria in July 2015 and he embarked on a clean sweep of heads of the administration. Unfortunately the price of oil plummeted and revenues dropped.
The Central bank of Nigeria restricted hard currency transactions and therefore imports have been difficult to fund. These have now been relaxed and the Naira has started to settle around NGN 310/US$.

The country has effectively been run by the Vice President: Acting President Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, for many months whilst the President has been undergoing medical treatment abroad. President Muhammadu Buhari returned to Nigeria at the end of August 2017 and resumed his duties as President. 
Following a ban on rice imports, there have been no rice vessels in Nigerian Ports for many months, and although restrictions are understood to have been lifted,  no rice vessels have been seen up to August 2017.

The Ports were at around 40% capacity with many workers laid off and agencies downsizing. Matters improved at the end of March 2017 where ports were beginning to have more vessels.

July and August are rainy season but early July has seen exceptional rain periods with much delays in discharge of dry products in the ports.

The local refineries have never functioned correctly and the oil products were bought abroad and imported. The price at the pumps was subsidised but was costing Billions of US Dollars. This subsidy has been removed and prices are rising and periods of shortages.

That subsidy has been revoked creating a backlash of revolt and strikes. Matters have settled down but inflation is a problem.

ACD/ICTN
ICTN Advance Cargo Declaration was to be implemented in November 2015 by the Shippers Council but had not been successfully put into operation and was delayed until 18 December 2015. It was subsequently promulgated for start on 1 January 2016 but many agents have not started paying the fees.

Agents are carefully watching for instructions but as of August 2017 agents had not implemented the procedures and were disputing the legality of the payments.

There have been many queries about payments for MRN and other dues and the advice being given is to liaise with the cargo agent and Charterer when voyages are being planned.

It now transpires that the Shippers Council have lost interest since the payments were not to be banked with them but with Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The implementation was news again in November 2016 but is yet to be implemented,

Officialdom
Masters can expect a myriad of officials boarding looking for “Gifts”. They range from the usual Immigration, Customs, Port Health and Drug Enforcement Officials to the clerk who records the vessel arrival in a ledger who insists to board the vessel to record this event and meet the Master.

The main officials such as Immigration etc will turn out in large numbers and each Officer will require their “Gifts”. This depletes the Master’s bonded goods and then soft drinks and foodstuffs have to be given.

Immigration regularly make meticulous searches through crew documents and if they do not find any discrepancies in the crew documents they will ask to see contracts and keep searching until they find some obvious error or will find something that they can claim as an infringement.

Any infringement attracts a fine of US$ 2,000. Fines for each crewman are often imposed generating up to US$ 28K for vessels with crews of 14.

Paying this fine is complicated requiring transfers to banks and reference to their HQ in Abuja. Typical times for this procedure is 10 working days. Disputing the fines will generate even longer delays and introduction of P&I and lawyers can also cause delays.

With the reduction in traffic the officials are “hungry” and take great pains to go through all documents and are starting to rummage all vessels looking for perceived infringements. Thus Masters are being harassed for many hours by Immigration, Customs and Health Officials looking to fund problems that do not exit to create “fines”.

Agents are best placed to deal with the authorities initially as they are known to be available and can be sanctioned after the vessel has sailed.

There has been a new directive on 19 May 2017 harmonising operations in the ports but is yet to be implemented and any differences noted:

"The Federal Government has directed all relevant ministries, departments and agencies operating at the nation’s airports and seaports to harmonise their operations into a single interface station.
While those at the airports have 30 days to merge, those operating at seaports must do so within 60 days.
This is one of the highlights of an ‘Executive Order on the Promotion of Transparency and Efficiency in the Business Environment’ signed by the Acting President, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, on Wednesday.
By the order, the Apapa Port is expected to resume 24-hour operations within 30 days.
The order read, “All relevant MDAs at the airports shall within 30 days of the issuance of this order merge their respective departure and arrival interfaces into a single customer interface, without prejudice to necessary back-end procedures."

Ports
Lagos/Apapa/TCIP
The Master can expect to see many vessels at anchor off Lagos and will be expected to navigate his way through about 80 vessels, many without lights.

The pilot joins the vessel at the last moment and vessels can wait for hours for the pilot who will keep calling the vessel but never appears.

The ports in Nigeria are all operational but the standards of pilotage, tugs and harbour control are very poor in all ports. There are no fixed cranes at any ports and discharges rely on ship's cranes or mobile cranes ashore. Crane control is very poor with much resultant damage and injuries which are blamed on vessels whatever the circumstances.

Once alongside Masters can expect a myriad of officials boarding besides the normal immigration, customs and Port Health looking for any errors in paperwork so they can impose fines. They will always find something to be able to fine the Master. There are no custom fines for excess or cargo or shortages other than duty on cargo actually discharged. Over declarations made mistakenly by Masters have attracted full duty with no refunds.

Stevedoring standards are also very poor with much damage caused by bad handling to bagged and general cargo. Bulk cargo discharges tend to be less troublesome but independent draught surveys are always recommended where appropriate.

Claims against stevedores, tugs, pilots and Nigerian Ports Authority Officials for damages are almost impossible to pursue or to be found in favour of the vessel.

NIMASA (Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency) have patrol boats manned by Nigerian Navy persecuting vessels for their fees and checking paperwork. If they detain a vessel it can take many weeks to release vessels after large fines are paid and involves lawyers. The charterer’s agent should be responsible for these fees and settle the authorities.

Stevedore Injuries
There have been a spate of stevedore injuries in one Terminal in particular which were onboard vessels but not caused by the vessel or crew.

All stevedores are required by law to be insured to carry out their tasks and enter Terminal. This insurance tends to be a paper exercise only and when a death or injury occurs onboard the Terminal operator, Stevedore Company and Unions (MWUN) look to the vessel for compensation. The Unions are of the opinion that the vessel P&I covers all stevedores and workmen boarding the vessel who are injured.

The cases of the claims for stevedore injuries from 2015 are ongoing with sanctions being put in place on agents by the Unions and Terminal Operators under the misapprehension that agents work for vessel owners. This is still extant August 2017 with cases outstanding rising.

Security
Nigerian Ports are all in operation with an increased state of security attacks by terrorists have fallen and pirate attacks have increased. A reported amnesty against MEND is reported to have fallen through and MEND are expected to restart attacks on the oil installations and pipelines but none have been reported recently.

Pirate attacks
The MO of the pirates is to select a vessel with a low freeboard and it may be up to 100 Nm off the coast but this does not seem to deter them. Once onboard their only objective is to steal what they can carry. They put communications out of action then systematically rob the crew of computers, mobile phones, jewellery and cash.

They used not to be interested in kidnap or ransoms but there have been regular kidnaps of Senior Crew. There is little that Masters can do as the pirates are armed and shoot up the bridge windows to gain access. Some vessels have rigged barbed wire/razor wire on the upper deck which takes many days to rig and does hamper pilots boarding and there may be safety implications for crew in case of emergency.

The least the resistance there is by crew results in the least the injuries to them. The use of Citadels has saved crews from kidnap when the vessels have been boarded and the Pirates just stole ship items and fled.

There are usually about 80 to 100 vessels anchored within 10 miles off Lagos and many more drifting between 20 to 100 Nm offshore. Some have taken to drifting 200 Nm offshore.

Lagos is operating as normal but with sporadic pirate attacks far offshore where vessels with low freeboards are the prime targets.

The final decision on safety of a port can be judged if the pilot and agent are prepared to board and bring the vessel into port. They have the up to date and localised knowledge and will not risk themselves if they consider the situation dangerous.

The pirate attacks have become more selective than they were in 2015 and 2016 as it seems the pirates now have better sea transport and navigational equipment that they have collected from earlier robberies. It is assessed they have access to AIS and are tracking vessels. Many Masters switch off AIS but have fallen foul of the Nigerian Navy who have tried to detain vessels for not using AIS.

Early in 2016 the Nigerian based pirate attacks began moving further north to up as far as Abidjan. Vessels are boarded and forced to steam down to off Bayelsa State.

Small tankers are being targeted off Bayelsa State as they proceed to and from the Bonny Area with the aim of stealing around 4 to 5,000 MT of cargo provided it is resaleable PMS or AGO. The Pirates board these tankers, take control and direct the Master to take the vessel to a STS position where the cargo is transferred to a pirate tanker or barge. All but essential crew are locked away from viewing the STS (ie pumpman and Chief Officer are employed but blindfolded when moving on deck). In all cases the crew are robbed and beaten up if they resist. These attacks last several days until cargo is removed. Damage to guardrails and deck fishplates when barges come alongside to steal cargo normally result as the pirates have no care for damages.

The trend for kidnap has increased and ransoms demands are based on the Nationality of the crew. There have been Pirate attacks off Bayelsa State in the first half of 2017 some were successful, such as an LPG vessel where 3 crew were kidnapped, others prevented them boarding and others where crew locked themselves in the Citadel and the accommodation ransacked for theft. It normally takes about 1 month to negotiate and effect release of kidnapped Crew.

The latest kidnap of crew was 30 July 2017 off Bonny Island:
30.07.2017: Posn: 04:10.12N – 006:59.44E, Around 15nm SW of Bonny Island, Nigeria.
Armed pirates boarded a general cargo ship underway. The incident was reported to the Nigerian navy who responded and located the ship. It was reported that some crew members were missing. The Nigerian navy vessel towed the ship to a safe port for investigation

Armed Guards
As a general rule it is not recommended to deploy armed guards onboard vessels unless a reputable registered company is used. Most Shipping Agencies will recommend use of armed guards on board as they apply a huge mark-up for services provided. Arrangements for Naval or Police armed guards can be done on an unofficial basis for which a cash transaction takes place. Middlemen will take their own cut hence the Agency's advise that guards should be used. Several vessels have been arrested and detained for several weeks by Nigerian Navy for having non Nigerian Navy armed guards onboard.

The Nigerian Navy maintain they are the only agency that should guard vessels but throughout 2014 would not put armed personnel onboard. In late June 2014 this policy was revised and began supplying Armed Guards.

In February 2015 this policy resulted in 5 ships being detained for having Armed Guards with a foreign unarmed Military Liaison Officer (MLO). NIMASA (Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency) boarded several vessels and accused the MLO of carrying arms. When it was explained that the MO was unarmed NIMASA said “how could he be a guard and not armed”. They further accused the MLOs of throwing their arms over the side. They further stated that if the MLO had not been caught he would have landed and disposed of his arms ashore thereby threatening the security of Nigeria. The vessels were detained between 4 and 6 weeks whilst lawyers fought for their release.

Companies supplying these Armed Guard Parties stopped using of MLOs and tried to clarify the situation of Armed Guards onboard vessels.

It should be noted that there have been several crew shot and killed by Armed Guards meant to protect them when embarked without a MLO. In an incident on 2 February 2015 there was a “home goal” the Armed Guards shot and killed a Chief Officer despite the Master instructing them not to engage the Pirates.

The provision of Armed Guards was not clear since the new administration came into control. The situation was such that there were many unregulated firms providing Armed Guards from Police and Marine Police for repayment via the ship agents which caused vessels to be arrested.

We discussed the situation late September 2015 with a company called LGS (www.lgs.global) where they say the situation has clarified in favour of the Nigerian Navy providing Armed Guards through certified security protection operators.

The security provider enters a contract with the vessel owners/charterers and then approaches the Nigerian Navy for the provision of Armed Guards and the necessary paperwork raised for the team to board the vessel.

Expatriate advisers have to be unarmed and have Temporary Work Permits and are only certified for the designated vessel(s).

This system seems to be working and has been used by reputable agencies. It is available in Lagos and Port Harcourt.

Terminals in the various ports refuse to have armed guards onboard when the vessel is alongside so the Armed Guards are limited to offshore.

Some companies providing the services are:

PGS WEST AFRICA
Andrew Mullins [email protected]
Director of Sales & Business Development
Nigeria Mob: +234 (0) 810 680 0759
Head Office Tel: +234 (0) 177 656 59
UK Mob: +44 (0) 7973 141296
UK Office Tel: + 44 (0) 207 205 4110
www.pgswestafrica.com

Mark Ellis [email protected] 
Senior Operations Manager
Tactical Operations Centre
www.saawestafrica.com
Primary (MTN) Mob +234 (0) 8149575796
Secondary (GLO) Mob: +234 (0) 8079407814
Landline: +234 (0) 177 65659
Ops Room 1: +234 (0) 8188689683
Ops Room 2: +234 (0) 8140171509
Sat Phone: +870776383477
Skype: PGS-TOC

LGS
LGS contact details are:
LGS Ltd
+234 8137569667
+2348038896639
[email protected]
www.lgs.global 
+234 (0)1 342 6062
+234 (0)803 889 6639

[email protected]

Another security company has had some reasonable success is Port to Port who have begun assessing a particular client’s needs.

Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) off Lagos
There is a Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) to the West of Lagos where ships may anchor and are guarded by the Nigerian Navy.

Details and costs are available on:
www.saawestafrica.com

It is still in use and successfully preventing any Pirate Attacks within the SAA and nearby Lagos anchorage.

Further Security solutions are available from the PGS company who work with OMS to run the SAA:
Andrew Mullins
Director of Sales & Business Development
Nigeria Mob: +234 (0) 810 680 0759
Head Office Tel: +234 (0) 177 656 59
UK Mob: +44 (0) 7973 141296
UK Office Tel: + 44 (0) 207 205 4110
www.pgswestafrica.com
Mark Ellis
Senior Operations Manager
Tactical Operations Centre
www.saawestafrica.com
Primary (MTN) Mob +234 (0) 8149575796
Secondary (GLO) Mob: +234 (0) 8079407814
Landline: +234 (0) 177 65659
Ops Room 1: +234 (0) 8188689683
Ops Room 2: +234 (0) 8140171509
Sat Phone: +870776383477
Skype: PGS-TOC

Also
Matt Owen
West Africa Manager
Ambrey International

UK: +44 (0) 7736 455 432 Nigeria: +234 (0) 903 656 1454 Togo: +228 (0) 923 362 04 DD: +44 (0) 203 503 0972
E: [email protected] | W: www.ambreyrisk.com

Nigerian Security Centres
There are several agencies that can be contacted when a Pirate Attack occurs. Unfortunately they have few assets and rely on Nigerian Navy patrol craft being in the area to reach the vessel under attack. These patrol craft have little fuel and their ranges are poor often returning to base rather than pursuing Pirates.

Useful contacts:

MRCC via +2348030685167
[email protected]

RMRCC Lagos, Nigeria.
TEL: +2348030685167, +234(0)17306618
SAT NO (BGAN): 00870772240598
INMARSAT C NO: 492052551
MMSI: 006570010E-MAIL: [email protected]

Joint Task Force (Op PULO SHIELD) covering the Niger Delta area
+234 (0)802 363 9153
+234 (0)703 9783346
Email: [email protected]
Naval Headquarters Operations Room
+234 (0)813 879 9220

Department of State Security
+234 (0)813 222 2106
+234 (0)813 222 2105

http://www.npf.gov.ng/formation-list/marine-police/

Port Harcourt guards and piracy
There is a Joint Task Force (JTF) escorting vessels from Bonny to Port Harcourt and there have been no attacks reported since 2015 in the Bonny River and area except further offshore. The latest being 30 July 2017.

Larger cargo vessels do not normally join the convoy.

The stretch of water between Lagos and Calabar off Bayelsa State was rife with Pirates waiting for low freeboard small tankers with refined cargo onboard. 

There are companies such as LGS who used to provide escort vessels and used to have an arrangement with the Nigerian Navy to protect vessels.

Vessels requiring to anchor at Bonny Island normally use the Inner Anchorage. This area is somewhat protected by the presence of Navy boats based at Bonny and for several years there have been no reported security breaches. The designated offshore anchorage at the Bonny Fairway buoy is to be avoided as it is considered dangerous due to the frequency of pirate attacks.

Many arriving vessels, in the absence of an available pilot, often transit the fairway channel unassisted. Permission to enter the channel and proceed to the inner anchorage should be obtained from Bonny Signal station as whenever any LNG tanker movements are scheduled all other traffic is suspended. Unlike most areas of Bonny River the fairway channel is well marked by pairs of port and starboard buoys. These are lit and maintained in position for regular use by LNG Tankers. Once inside the river and on approaching the anchorage great care must be exercised to look out for small fishing craft occupying the shipping channel. Often they do not register as radar targets and can be very numerous at times.

From Onne to Bonny there is a daily escorted convoy which leaves early morning and returns in the afternoon. The transit of supply vessels up the Bonny River to Port Harcourt is arranged by the Joint Task Force against terrorists and these vessels go in convoys (on a repayment charge) and the offshore oil export Terminals are patrolled by private security or Nigerian Navy. This is used by small service boats working for the oil industry. Tankers and cargo vessels normally transit the river without escorts and again it is a very long time since any problems were encountered. Inland waterway passages are made in daylight hours and, except in emergencies, vessels should not anchor in any location other than the previously mentioned Bonny Inner anchorage area.

If vessels need to wait offshore they usually do so over 100 nautical miles from the coast where although piracy is not totally unknown it is relatively rare.

The costs of using these escorts and safe anchorages are too prohibitive for small tanker operators and hence they run the gauntlet of using illegal private hire Armed Guards.

Stowaways
Stowaways are a big problem and can board when the vessel is underway if the rudder trunk has a void. Thorough stowaway searches by the crew should be done meticulously. If possible open rudder trunk internal access manholes or fit bars on accesses internally to monitor the space on the outward transit. Padlocks on doors should be checked by key as it is common for stowaways to break off locks and enter compartments and then get an accomplice to fit a new padlock. The stowaways escape by banging on the door to attract crew attention. In some previous cases some access manholes have been unbolted, stowaways secreted and an accomplice then re-bolts the access plate. Therefore if the nuts look loose, missing or show obvious signs of access then check (one Master found new paint on the nuts and found stowaways inside an upperdeck void space).

The rudder trunk is the favourite hiding place and if possible the vessel should anchor offshore for about 24 hours and the stowaways usually declare themselves within this period. It is advised that once stowaways are found the Master should contact P&I Correspondent by non VHF means eg telephone or e-mail in order not to alert officials who will want large fines paid and may delay the vessel. The correspondent may be able to arrange a speedboat to remove the stowaways without too much fuss but at a cost.

16 stowaways were found in a rudder trunk on one vessel in late October 2016 after the vessel returned to Nigeria being 1 day’s sailing and dropped them offshore with Immigration. There are US$ 2,000 fines per stowaway returned (even Nigerian Nationals) but is usually cheaper to return them by the vessel turning back if within 2 to 3 days out of Nigeria rather than proceed with large numbers to Europe or the Americas where costs of repatriation are extremely high and difficult to arrange.

Stowaways are organised and expect to be bribed to take flights if they manage to get abroad. If they cause problems the airlines refuse to accept them on flights even with escorts.

On 13 November 2016 a vessel had to charter a Boeing 737 aircraft to fly 14 stowaways with 15 escorts from Venezuela to Lagos.

Stowaways can get access to vessels using Port Passes they have been issued with when working as stevedores or labourers in the ports. A few dollars payment will get them through any security check to board a vessel as labourers. There has been a marked increase in stowaways late 2016 as the ports are at an estimated 40% capacity and much labour has been laid off. This labour knows the workings of the ports and how to secrete themselves away onboard.

Health
There are no Ebola or other reported health problems in Nigeria other than the WHO recommended precautions and crew requiring in date Yellow Fever vaccinations etc

Warri
Vessels normally discharge bulk cargo in Lagos or Port Harcourt before discharging at Warri where there are draught restrictions.

Warri has to be accessed via the Escravos River which means daylight pilotage. Once alongside groundings in the soft mud are common at low water. The Port of Warri can only be accessed via the Escravos bar and several vessel went aground at 5.8 metres draught at High Water due to silting. Dredging is not being carried out and the situation is deteriorating as of November 2016

If the cargo is wheat/grains in bulk there are no stevedore problems with theft and damage. Shore figures inevitably show shortages which can be defended with an independent draught survey. Shore weighing equipment is usually uncertificated and can be claimed to be inaccurate.

Warri and Sapele (further up river) have been quiet as far as security is concerned and the ports are regularly visited by other vessels without incident.

Calabar
We have no list of draughts alongside but since the Calabar port has draught restrictions and fewer vessels call there the atmosphere is calmer and slower than the major ports. Draught restrictions mean only small tankers and vessels with low draughts can get up river.

Local thieves accidentally started a fire in Calabar in mid July 2017 whilst stealing fuel from a shore facility which spread to nearby vessels in ECM Terminal. Crew should have a procedure for fighting fires over the rails.

Port Harcourt
Vessels Offshore & Proceeding to & from Bonny Town, Onne, Okrika and Port Harcourt.
As a general rule it is not recommended to deploy armed guards on board vessels either for the river passage or alongside the various berths.

First of all it will not deter any Pirates or Militants if they decide to board the vessel. The Militant factions, from where the pirates usually originate, are very well armed. They have superior weapons and more ammunition than the Government Joint Task Force (JTF) which is made up of Navy, Army, Police and other Nigerian Security Agencies. They also have faster boats and can easily and rapidly muster a fleet of up to a dozen or more small craft each with 6 or 8 fully armed occupants.

Secondly the presence of armed personnel on board a vessel can be seen as a provocation and actually encourage an attack. In case of attack the armed guards, usually only two or four in number, strip off and hide uniforms and guns to emerge in boxer shorts and T-shirts as civilian workers. Earning perhaps US$80.00 per month, they are happy to get an extra US$10.00 per day for guard duties but knowing that their commanding officer is pocketing around $100 - $150 per man per day does not encourage any acts of bravery when massively outnumbered and out gunned!

There is a regular escorted daily convoy to and from Onne Port which is used by supply boats. Despite the presence of highly visible, armed JTF escort boats, this convoy has been attacked on several occasions.

The only purpose in employing guards on board would be to give crew members a (false) sense of security.

The main danger area is close offshore, usually near Bonny Fairway buoy. If waiting for a berth it is recommended staying in excess of 100 miles offshore. (Master’s should inform Agents of this practice as the ship will be outside of VHF coverage and unable to receive berthing instructions from the shore Signal Station). Small open craft can attack even beyond this great distance from shore as they carry drums of fuel to run the outboard engines and extend the operating range. A close lookout should be kept for such small boats which are of fibreglass construction and do not show up on radar. They can also be difficult to spot in the trough of the sea and swell.

Main engines should be kept on constant standby for immediate use. If any boat approaches, the Master should steam maximum full speed ahead into the sea and swell. This makes it very difficult for small boats to come alongside and use grappling hooks to board. Normally vessels with a low freeboard are targeted due to ease of boarding making small, loaded tankers a prime target along with supply boats and even small, loaded reefer ships.

There have been a few occasions where a supply boat was first commandeered to facilitate boarding of a larger vessel. Whilst this is very rare masters should be wary of all approaching craft.

Larger vessels such as bulk carriers and crude oil tankers are less liable to attack due to the difficulty in boarding but nevertheless the risk exists especially if the vessel is immobilized relatively close to the shore. Some time ago a variation in the Piracy attack pattern was noted. Previously vessels were boarded for petty robbery motives when cash, lap top computers, mobile phones and other saleable small items such as radio handsets were stolen. Crew members on occasions were kidnapped and held to ransom. In recent times several small tankers have been hijacked to steal cargo, mostly petrol or other refined products. The hijackers obviously have navigational experience as they sail to a distant offshore rendezvous point, unaided by ships officers, where they meet another vessel waiting to receive transferred cargo. They have also been known to open VDR control boxes and destroy the hard drive as well as cutting wires to AIS and other devices which could possibly divulge the vessels position. This is a fairly new development in Nigeria and so far only a few relatively small tankers have been targeted. At present the trend is for Pirates to board seeking hostages and also to look for saleable items. Nigeria is presently in recession and petty crime and Kidnapping is on the increase both on and offshore.

The Oil Majors operating offshore fields in the region deploy privately hired patrol boats to safeguard their operations. These small boats are generally manned by armed navy personnel but usually outnumbered by pirates and, with inferior arms, they often avoid direct confrontation with any pirate attack forces. In case of any incursion, even close to their allotted concession area, they cannot be relied upon to offer assistance beyond the limit of their field of operations.

Similarly, although Navy boats are stationed at Bonny Town, they are notorious for only answering Mayday calls when they are sure the pirates are no longer in the area, usually 4 or 5 hours later. The Bonny Signal Station is also renowned for failing to answer calls at many times even for normal movement information.

It should be borne in mind that many of these attackers possess automatic weapons with armour piercing bullets so hiding inside cabins does not guarantee safety. In general the boarders do not intentionally try to harm crew members. To intimidate crew and discourage any resistance, the pirates often open fire indiscriminately “spraying” the vessel with bullets from high powered automatic weapons such as AK 47 machine guns. At times they have also been known to throw sticks of dynamite on to ships decks. (If the explosive lands on an open deck area, damage is not usually caused apart from scorch marks). It is such undisciplined acts, however, which can cause unintended injury to crew members. If the vessel is boarded no resistance should be made and even hiding inside locked cabins can provoke a violent reaction.

Most Shipping Agencies will recommend use of armed guards on board as they apply a huge mark-up for services provided. Arrangements for Naval or Police armed guards are done on an unofficial basis for which a cash transaction takes place. Middlemen will take their own cut hence most Shipping Agencies advise that guards should be used, but it is worth noting that the majority of incidents occur close offshore when guards will not normally have boarded.

Considering the main danger zone to be the area closest to Bonny Fairway Buoy, waiting vessels should only frequent this location when arriving to pick up the inbound pilot. On many occasions vessels are instructed to proceed to the Fairway buoy only to be told to wait as the pilot and/or pilot boat was not available. This situation can last many hours and the pilot is not even sure to board the same day. In such circumstances it is recommended that ships enter the channel and proceed in to Bonny Town Inner Anchorage under the Master’s command and without Pilot assistance. This happens very often as the signal station can tell ships to commence the inbound passage to meet the pilot knowing perfectly that one is not available. Many vessels calling here on a regular basis always enter or leave the river without any pilot. This avoids delays and the added risk of hanging around near the Fairway Buoy advertising a vulnerable target for pirates. Although Pilotage is compulsory this is not enforced, except perhaps for payment of dues. Bonny Signal Station, if they can be contacted, will give permission for ships to enter or depart without pilot. It is necessary to ensure that there are no LNG tanker sailings or arrivals scheduled as they have absolute priority and all other traffic is suspended pending completion of gas tanker movements.

Bonny Town Inner Anchorage is used by waiting tankers and cargo ships and for regular midstream discharge of Bulk Cement Carriers. Due to the proximity of Navy personnel and JTF forces and boats based in Bonny, this is the only anchorage we recommend as suitable, security-wise.

The channel from Bonny Town to the Fairway Buoy is deep, wide and well marked by functioning light buoys which are reported to be in their charted positions. Masters can easily navigate this channel night or day relying on these navigational aids. Note that it is only this first stretch of the channel where reliable navigational aids exist. Note also that Satellite generated positions throughout this region are subject to local anomalies and should not be relied upon as the sole means of determining the vessel’s position. For all other sections of the river it is necessary to have a pilot on board to provide local knowledge. Similarly navigation in the river upstream of Bonny should be totally avoided outside the hours of daylight for both navigational and security reasons.

Once alongside the cargo berth, vessels are generally considered to be safe. Attacks on ships in Port are almost unknown and it has been many years since the last reported incident.

A barge was being used for illegal bunkering and was fired on by the Nigerian Navy causing it to catch fire in the early hours of 11 August 2017. Unfortunately, it drifted into the main port causing 2 vessels to catch fire. Crew should have a procedure for fighting fires over the rails.

On departure it is necessary to take time to thoroughly check for stowaways. Apart from the usual hideouts, particular attention should be made to open rudder trunk compartments which have recently been very popular as a hiding place. Even if the space has been closed by welded bars it is still necessary to check as we have had several occasions where stowaways have used hacksaws to gain entry. We advise checking before and also after departure from the jetty. It is not unknown for stowaways to chase ships in speedboats and climb on the rudder during the outbound river passage. Some vessels connect hoses to the ventilation pipes on these compartments and pump water at all times during the Port stay to deter potential stowaways.

Note that if at any time, even during the port call, stowaways are discovered, the recommended action is to call the Agent to deal with the issue. Use telephone and avoid announcing their presence on VHF which can result in Authorities rushing on board, threatening the master with fines and accusing the crew of complicity etc.

Local thieves accidentally started a fire in Port Harcourt in mid August 2017 whilst stealing fuel from a shore facility which spread to nearby vessels in the Port Harcourt main port. Crew should have a procedure for fighting fires over the rails.

Please note that above information is not intended to cause any panic but is given as precautionary advice. Despite the numerous incidents it has always been business as usual and vessels of all types continue to trade regularly throughout the region, mostly without problem.

 

For more information, please contact your usual Steamship Mutual contact.

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