


## JMTC INFORMATION NOTE 03 AUG '24 (01) – Incident Number 88

### MISSILE ATTACKS INVOLVING A LIBERIA-FLAGGED CONTAINER VESSEL, GROTON, 170 NM EAST OF ADEN, YEMEN

#### INCIDENT REPORT

1. There were two reported missile attacks on a Liberia-flagged container vessel, **GROTON** (IMO: 9246310), while transiting the Gulf of Aden.
  - The first attack occurred 170 NM East of Aden, Yemen on 03 AUG '24 at 13:30 (UTC) (Ref. UKMTO Incident Warning 104)
  - The second attack occurred 125 NM East of Aden at 17:59 (UTC) (Ref. UKMTO Incident Warning 105)

(See **Picture 1** for incident location)





2. The JMIC has confirmed that m/v GROTON was subject to two missile attacks.
  - a. 13:30 UTC. The vessel was underway with AIS ON when targeted by the first missile 170 NM East of Aden (Yemen). The vessel reported an explosion 1 cable astern of the vessel. The vessel was not hit, reporting no damage.
  - b. 17:59 UTC. The second attack occurred 125 NM East of Aden and struck the vessel above the waterline, causing minor damage.

All crew on board are safe (no injury reported). The vessel was reported diverting to a port nearby.
3. JMIC assesses that GROTON was targeted due to other vessels within its company structure making recent port calls in Israel.

## JMIC GUIDANCE

4. Freedom of navigation and the free flow of maritime commerce continue as a top priority while the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The current threat assessment identifies:
  - a. Vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk
  - b. Any vessel within a Group or Company fleet structure whereby the company has been identified making port calls to Israel
5. **Vessels** intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:
  - a. Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area
  - b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
  - c. Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. intra-ship UHF/VHF transmissions) and AIS policy in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area is to be very carefully considered as part of the voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting



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- i. While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise the safety & security of the vessel and crew
      - ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning
    - d. Do not loiter when transiting the threat area and proceed with caution
    - e. If contacted by any unrecognized organization:
      - i. Report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
    - f. If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy”:
      - i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so
      - ii. Describe the incident in follow up reports to UKMTO
    - g. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
      - i. UAV sightings
      - ii. Communications challenges
    - h. In case of unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
      - i. Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
      - ii. Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
      - iii. Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
      - iv. Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)
6. **Maritime Industry** is recommended to:
  - a. Conduct a threat & risk assessment of all associated vessels and especially those that may have previous USA, UK or Israel ownership or associations [*to include recent port calls by vessels within the company and/or group structure*]
  - b. **Companies should plan and implement risk mitigation measures in advance of the furthest identified attack areas as depicted in the JMIC ‘Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities’ slide**
  - c. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
  - d. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
  - e. Review digital footprint



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- f. The JMTC is aware of increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators
  - i. If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
  - ii. Any response should be carefully considered
  - iii. Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi's Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with your company's CSO
- g. Open-source claims that vessels are targeted may not be factual
  - i. JMTC recommends verifying source for legitimacy

## **Additional Resources on Incident:**

UKMTO Reporting Visit: <https://www.ukmto.org>

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org)

Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060

## **Additional Resources on Industry Guidance:**

BMP 5 – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea:  
<https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf>

ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers:  
[https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file\\_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2](https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2)